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“Let us make it our job, NOT to see through one another, but to see one another through.” 
(Duncan Mwanjila, Project Manager TDIP from 1992 to August 1997) 
Land in the Tana River Delta is a highly valued resource and consequently a strongly desired 
asset. As population density in the Tana River Delta District increased at considerable speed over 
the last decades, access to water and natural resources has become increasingly problematic. 
Traditionally, local communities used to rely on a wide range of risk-spreading livelihood 
strategies such as farming, fishing, livestock and beekeeping, hunting, gathering, etc. Their 
coping mechanisms were based on profound environmental and wetland knowledge and have 
principally been determined by the flooding regime and seasonal changes of the Tana River 
(long rainy season from mid-March to mid-June and short rainy season from mid-October to 
mid- December). Aiming for higher productivity, the introduction of development and irrigation 
projects has altered traditional usage of natural resources. 
However, knowledge of the balance between nature and human activities and the understanding 
of the services ecosystems provide is of great importance in decision- making on sustainable use. 
This study raises the hypothesis that a bottom-up approach to the implementation of 
development projects with the added value of population consultation might have achieved better 
results. The study has been conducted within the framework of a multidisciplinary (hydrological, 
ecological, anthropological) three-year research project on the Tana River Delta coordinated by 
IRD–IFRA (Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement – Institut Français de Recherche en 
Afrique), in partnership with the National Museum of Kenya (NMK), the Kenya Wildlife 
Services (KWS) and Tanzanian institutions. The study combines the consultation of existing data 
and documents with a four-week field visit (15 April to 10 May, 2009). The fieldwork consisted 
of group discussions and participatory mapping exercises in two predominantly Pokomo and one 
Orma village, respectively Hewani, Vumbwe and Baandi. Likewise, different transect walks 
were undertaken in and around the project area. Various stakeholders and resource persons 
(researchers, TARDA employees …) were also interviewed. The relevance of this analysis lies in 
its effort to provide insight into the perception of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
irrigation project by collecting facts and views from different stakeholders. This information is 
important in making a comparison of the project’s achievements and failures. In this manner, 
lessons learned from past mistakes can improve the implementation of future projects. 
Tana Delta Irrigation Project TDIP 
The implementation of the Tana Delta Irrigation Project (TDIP) east of Garsen started in 19881 
and covered an area of 2400 ha, called ‘Polder 1 North’ divided into Blocks A to G. The project 
was financed by the Japanese Government, through the Japanese Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF). The Kenyan Government had requested this ODA loan (Overseas 
Development Aid) in order to increase the country’s rice production with the aim of promoting 
self-sufficiency and import substitution. Since the beginning of the project the Tana and Athi 
River Development Authority, better known as TARDA, has been the Kenyan parastatal in 
charge of “advising on the institution and co-ordination of the development project” (Chapter 
443, Tana and Athi River Development Authority Act). 
This project was intended to raise the living standards 
and improve food security in the Tana River Delta District. A total of 58.6 billion Kenyan 
Shillings (725.9 million USD) was made available for the project’s infrastructure, machinery, 
institutions such as schools, health centers, police stations, and more. Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. was 
the International Consulting Engineering Company appointed by the Japanese Government to 
conduct and supervise these construction works and the necessary research (e.g. on suitable rice 
varieties, seed multiplication, etc). By 1997 more than 4.2 billion Ksh (73.7 USD) had been 
spent and about 80% of the project had been installed. Unfortunately in 1998 the whole region 
was hit by an El Niño related flood, creating enormous chaos and destroying a great part of the 
completed infrastructure. The most devastated area was the lower part of the TDIP farm while 
Blocks A, B, C and D remained relatively undamaged. Due the El Niño floods and related 
harvest losses (the rice of Block G was totally lost), 1998 was marked by major food shortages, 
displacements and numerous cholera and malaria victims. After the catastrophe, the TDIP never 
fully recovered and, even worse, lost its support from the Japanese Government. However, many 
questions remain. Why was the TDIP never completely rehabilitated, while it could produce tons 
of good quality rice? How severely could an El Niño destroy a new 58.6 billion Ksh project? 
What were the reasons for the Japanese leaving the project? How did all this change the 
livelihood opportunities of the local communities? What role do ethics play in this development 
project? 
Environment 
As perceived through many discussions and testimonies during the fieldwork, life in the Tana 
River Delta is currently quite tough. Drought, poverty and high unemployment rates are rife. The 
infrastructure put in place by the TDIP during the late 1980s, early 1990s has had an important 
influence on the natural environment in the area. The major embankment surrounding the farm 
was initially welcomed as it ensured flood protection for the villages and their recession 
agriculture fields or shamba as well as for the existing small-scale irrigation schemes of Hewani, 
Wema and Kulesa. The Orma village “Baandi” inside the dyke actually derives its name from the 
protective band. The Orma community settled there after the construction of the dyke as floods 
often affected their original village just outside the embankment. The upgrading of roads and 
access of the area was another positive aspect of the TDIP. It opened up the wetlands to transport 
and created additional marketing opportunities. 
Water supply for irrigation of the farm was regulated through a network of supply and drainage 
canals around and in between the different TDIP Blocks. Water from the Tana River was 
diverted through a head canal — north of the farm — and subsequently by a major sluice-gate at 
Sailoni, composed of an inflatable rubber dam and a system of sluice- gates to regulate the flow 
into the canals of the irrigation scheme. As the TDIP-controlled area used to be part of a wider 
wetland ecosystem, connected to many lakes (e.g. Chamadho, Jange, Musenkwa, Mulanja, etc.) 
and dense forests (Masha, Kirume, Mkuyumbe, etc.); it is not difficult to imagine that the 
scheme brought big changes to the local ecosystems and the services they provided. 
The project continued to produce rice until 2003 and after that the rubber dam was still being 
used to irrigate shamba from Sailoni to Kulesa. Unfortunately, the inflatable dam burst in 2006, 
making it impossible to irrigate any plot from that moment on. This means that today people are 
forced to rely on rainfed agriculture, principally maize. With very low rainfall at Garsen, rainfed 
agriculture is a very risky bet. As the rains have kept the communities waiting this year, food 
security is becoming an issue. Moreover, the embankment, its canal system and the upstream 
river diversions (e.g. at Mnazini) have caused almost all lakes to dry out, reducing the fishing 
places to a minimum. During flood peaks, the dyke also causes a higher water level outside the 
TDIP, destroying perennial crops like bananas, mangos, 
along the river. 
It should be mentioned that the 1983 draft EIA report to TARDA already predicted numerous 
problems but the parastatal refused to recognize these findings. The problems envisaged were the 
disruption of Orma pastoralists’ use of the rangelands and interference with their ability to water 
livestock; the toxicity of the mercury-based biocide, “panogeen” (sprayed aerially), and the 
threat to fragile, disappearing riverine forests and two endangered species of monkey (Hirji and 
Ortolano, 1991), namely the Tana River Red Colobus Procolubus rufomitratus and the Tana 
River Crested Mangabey Cercocebus galeritus (Butynski et al 2008, www.iucnredlist.org). 
Land and community consultation 
Aside from the environmental and livelihood issues, the project raises a profound ownership 
issue. The project was implemented under an estate system instead of a tenant system. This 
means that the management and execution of all processes like production, harvesting and sales 
was conducted by the TDIP Office. In other words, ploughing, harrowing, sowing, provision and 
distribution of seeds, water, fertilizer and chemicals was done by the TDIP itself, while the 
community members guaranteed weeding, bird and wildlife control through casual contracts. As 
the land in question is County Council trust land, communities have no actual title deed despite 
having used it for decades. After the construction of the embankment, the executive company 
TARDA claimed all land inside the protective band was their property. During the fieldwork the 
local communities expressed that they were perceived as “squatters on their own land”. Still, 
TARDA only obtained an allotment letter from the County Council, which is valid for three 
months, but no title deed. In 1995 the communities took TARDA to the Mombasa High Court 
(Civil Case No. 660), fighting this land ownership issue. The case is still pending and no 
statement has been made because of absences in court and “other reasons only known by 
TARDA” have caused the hearings to be postponed each time. Unfortunately, most of the 
plaintiffs, essentially village elders, have already passed away. 
Many of these complications could have been avoided by a more participatory approach and by 
applying a tenant system, whereby TARDA would provide water, sell fertilizers and chemicals 
to the farmers, and buy and process the rice. This system is adopted by the National Irrigation 
Board (NIB) (e.g. in Mwea and Perkerra) and appears successful. 
The local communities complain that they have never properly been consulted about the 
irrigation project. This lack of grass-roots level interaction is reflected in the various problems 
and disagreements. One problem, for example, is that the TDIP does not include a grazing 
corridor for livestock. This created conflict between the farmers, the pastoralists and TARDA 
about cows and goats grazing in the rice fields. Another problem concerns the population growth 
in the villages. The TDIP shamba have been boundaries so close to the villages that it has 
become impossible for villagers to expand their housing plots. 
Generally speaking, it can be argued that the communities have faced many unmet promises 
from TARDA’s end. After the El Niño, the payment of salaries for labour encountered delays 
and community dissatisfaction has continued unabated. 
To conclude, it should be noted that today different foreign companies have come forward to 
implement other large-scale agriculture projects. Mumias Ltd. and MAT International aim at 
introducing irrigated sugarcane and Bedford Biofuels wants to grow Jatropha in the area. Part of 
the Delta would be handed over to Qatar for fruit and vegetable production. However, the failure 
of the TDIP and its approach proves that local communities must be consulted and included in 
the process if sustainable decision-making is to be achieved. The complexity and diversity of the 
environment and its livelihood should to be studied in detail before undertaking action. 
Development is about strengthening the coping mechanisms of the local actors and creating 
opportunities, not breaking them. 
“Today’s problems cannot be solved if we still think the way we thought when we created 
them.” 
Albert Einstein 
Delphine Lebrun 
At the time this article was written, Delphine Lebrun was an intern at IFRA, working closely 
with Institut de recherche pour le développement, IRD. 
Note 
1 The feasibility study was carried out by Haskonning Royal Dutch Consulting Engineers and 
Architects in November 1982 and updated in 1987, while the EIA study was finalized in July 
1985 (with draft reports in December 1982 and October 1983). 
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